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After the fall of the Berlin wall, Vaclav Havel was rumoured to have said that 
European history had ‘started walking again.’ In a sense, the disappearance of the 
most important border in Europe,1 separating the OECD countries from those of 
the Warsaw Pact, meant that once again both sides could independently pursue 
their goals. Since that moment a kind of Drang nach Osten has filtered the 
process of European construction. The ‘return to Europe’ of the Warsaw Pact 
countries became one of Europe’s most important aims. Even before Maastricht, 
European foreign policy concentrated on Central and Eastern Europe, most 
notably through projects like the PHARE Plan in 1989, EBRD in 1990, and EU 
Association Agreements with the Visegrad countries in 1991. Other new 
institutional arrangements between Eastern and Western Europe include the 
Stability Pact (1994), the statute of WEU Associated Partnership, NATO 
Partnership for Peace, and the strategy for EU enlargement approved by the 
European Council in Essen (December 1994). Clearly, Europe has begun the 
process of integrating these countries in terms of political institutions and security 
concerns.2
But, while the EU presumably has been concentrating its efforts on Central 
and Eastern European Countries, it has also dedicated more attention than ever 
before to non-EU Mediterranean Countries. The November 1995 Euro- 
Mediterranean Conference, organised under the leadership of the Spanish EU 
president and held in Barcelona, is the best example of the EU’s paradoxical 
strategy.3 Much like Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean countries 
have established political dialogues with the EU (Barcelona process), WEU, and 
NATO. How can the EU’s dual affection be explained? This paper examines the 
EU’s paradoxical strategy and its links to the national policies of the Southern 
and Northern EU Member States. The explanation offered in this paper may also 
help to answer one of the main questions raised in this book: are the EU’s policy 
objectives different from its Member States?
Geography rises again
Experience shows that among the many ways in which countries cooperate with 
each other, foreign policy coordination has always been the most difficult to 
achieve. Regelsberger and Wessels point out that the difficulty is due to the ‘DDS 
(discreet, discretionary, sovereignty) syndrome;’ that is, that coordination of 
foreign policy and security raises immediately, and most visibly, the issue of 
national sovereignty.4 According to Regelsberger and Wessels, the success of 
foreign policy coordination depends on bilateral efforts to accommodate 




























































































The divergent traditions and conflicting interests in the foreign policy of 
the European Political Cooperation (EPC) countries were obvious, but for two 
decades, this policy coordination mechanism functioned quite well. Since the end 
of the Cold War, however, cooperation has been shaky. The interests among EU 
countries have diverged in this period due to the so-called forces profondes.5 
Elements of national power6 and traditional factors,7 such as geographical 
location, historical experience, and cultural links to non-EU countries, have also 
become stronger during this period. Examples of paradoxical behaviour abound: 
the negotiations on the transformation from EPC to Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), were held while Member States were simultaneously 
renationalising their security policies due to the ‘open space’ atmosphere. Such 
discrepancies show that the disappearance of the Iron Curtain has produced not 
only centripetal forces, deepening the European construction process, but also 
centrifugal forces that have driven the process of sub-regionalisation and created 
‘spheres of influence' among EU Member States. Southern European countries 
(Spain, France, Italy), motivated by the fear of a destabilised Arab world, have 
created a Mediterranean spécificité. In the North, Germany and the Nordic 
countries hope to recreate the Hanseatic world, now made possible by the 
disappearance of the Soviet Union. ‘Mental maps,’ based on geography, history, 
and culture, have emerged in the European collective consciousness: 
‘Mittleuropa,’ or the Baltic sea as a ‘mythical source of identity’8 may now propel 
the foreign and security policy of certain Member States.
Geography-based division of labour poses a dear danger to coordinated 
security. A Bertelsmann Foundation report warns that while
there may be some scope for the idea of some form of ‘military division of labour’ 
between WEU member states on functional lines...this should not be extended to a 
geographical division of labour, since, by appearing to endorse the idea of national 
‘spheres of influence,’ it would tend to undermine rather than strengthen a common 
European approach. Some countries may have more military resources available for 
particular areas by virtue of geography -for example Sweden in the Baltic or Italy in the 
Mediterranean. But a primary purpose of a common defence policy is to ensure that 
members can rely on other members for support, wherever that support is needed...The 
organisation of ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’ in response to particular crises is 
unlikely to contribute to the strengthening of CFSP. Rather, there is a danger that such 
coalitions will be regarded as a reflection of the CFSP’s weakness, illustrating the very 
real risk that, with the Soviet threat gone, European defence will become increasingly 
‘renationalised’9
Evidence exists that the renationalisation process (converting European policy 
into policing each country’s sphere of influence) has already begun. Two cases 
demonstrate this shift: the German policy, favouring the diplomatic recognition of 



























































































European construction to Mediterranean stability. In both cases, the national 
strategies pursued by individual countries were converted into EU policies. In the 
first case, Germany’s unilateral move to grant the rapid recognition of the two 
former Yugoslav republics, was a complete departure from all the collective 
policy commitments it had made, but nevertheless forced other European 
countries to follow its lead. Different theories have been offered to explain 
Germany’s behaviour. Traditional power-politics explanations (based on 
Germany’s geo-economic and geopolitical sphere of influence) have clashed with 
institutionalist approaches. The latter is best described by Bulmer and Paterson 
who argue that ‘Germany’s unilateralism was the product not only of domestic 
pressure for recognition [of Slovenia and Croatia] but also of dissatisfaction with 
the faltering nature of EPC decision making on Yugoslavia...German power will 
become more evident where European institutions prove to be weak.’10 (1996:17).
Spain could not act unilaterally as Germany had in pursuing its policies in 
the Mediterranean due to the high financial costs associated with stabilising the 
region. Instead, Spain undertook a traditional lobbying approach and was able to 
convince European organisations to commit to Spanish objectives. By May 1989, 
Spain, along with other EU-Mediterranean countries, were defined as EU 
‘mentors’ for the Maghreb countries in the final resolution approved by the 
second Forum on the Western Mediterranean Countries."
Shifting and balancing
Even before the fall of the Berlin wall, the relations between the EC and certain 
East-bloc countries had changed dramatically. Domestic changes in Poland and 
Hungary combined with Germany’s assertiveness in the EC brought about a 
pledge by the EC that Germany would have a privileged relationship with Central 
and Eastern European countries. During the Paris Arch Summit held in July 1989, 
the EC assigned Germany the task of coordinating the PHARE Plan. This move 
also meant that the Community was assuming comprehensive responsibilities in 
Central European countries, beyond simply economic assistance12
From that moment, lobbyists for the Mediterranean policy feared that the 
EC’s attention and resources would be completely shifted to the Central and 
Eastern European countries and away from the Mediterranean countries. To pre­
empt this shift, Abel Matutes (the Spanish EC Commissioner in charge of 
Mediterranean policy, relations with Latin America and Asia, and North-South 
relations) suggested that the Community establish a ‘parallel program’ for Eastern 
Europe and the Mediterranean region.13 Matutes’s opinion was in complete 




























































































behind EU Mediterranean policy.14 After Matutes’s term expired in 1992, his 
portfolio was given to another Spaniard, Manuel Marin. The Spanish policy has 
always been clear: Felipe Gonzalez has repeatedly emphasised the dangers related 
to shifting the focus away from the Mediterranean countries. One clear example 
was his visit to Morocco in December 1995, where Gonzalez advised the 
Moroccan prime minister to put pressure on Brussels to maintain its 
Mediterranean focus.15
In other words, the Arab and the ACP countries’ status as the EC’s 
geopolitical and geo-economic ‘most favoured region’ ended in 1989.16 In the 
early 1990s, the ratio of EC aid to the Central and Eastern European Countries in 
comparison with that of the Mediterranean Countries was 2.5 to 1. When 
population differences are added, that ratio translates into one ECU of EC 
economic assistance for each Mediterranean citizen to five ECU for every East 
European citizen. This difference is greater still when taking into consideration 
other quantitative items, like bilateral economic assistance and private 
investment.
The paradox of this uneven ratio becomes evident when you consider 
Europe’s energy dependence on the Arab countries or Euro-Mediterranean trade 
figures,17 which alone could have justified a privileged relationship with the EC. 
The seemingly paradoxical behaviour of granting more aid to Eastern Europe is 
based on feelings of European ‘solidarity’ and historical responsibility for the 
region,18 while EC’s interest in the Mediterranean countries is solely based on 
security. Referring to the beginning of the post-Cold War era, Dinan points out 
that ‘the Community’s preoccupation with Eastern Europe almost blinded 
Brussels to developments in the South, where economics and political instability 
threaten the Community’s security.’19 Southern EU members lobbying for 
Mediterranean countries began emphasising the security concerns in the region in 
an effort to compete with the excitement of EU’s Eastern expansion. As a result 
Matutes’s suggestion for a parallel policy for both Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean region evolved conceptually into a balancing strategy, based on 
the so-called solidarity vs security approach.
Balancing is a familiar concept in European construction. In fact, the life of 
the EU has been a history of balancing small and large countries, rich and poor 
countries, supranationalism and intergovemmentalism, and European aims and 
national priorities. Therefore, balancing Eastern and Mediterranean policies is a 





























































































Mediterranean stability means European construction
Many believe that the EU’s relationship with the Mediterranean countries will 
influence European construction. At the height of the Persian Gulf Crisis Felipe 
Gonzalez said: ‘I think, like François Mitterrand, that the construction of Europe 
cannot be attained without first trying to resolve the explosive problems that are 
building up in North Africa with respect to demography, development, religion 
and the standard of living.’20 The belief in Euro-Mediterranean interdependence 
has made the region a diplomatic priority for Spain, France, and Italy. These 
countries and the EC have promoted diplomatic initiatives in the Mediterranean 
region, based on the global security approach,21 as well as a multidimentional 
agenda involving environmental, socio-economic and cultural issues. One such 
initiative was the Spanish-Italian proposal of convening a Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). This initiative was presented by 
the flamboyant Italian foreign minister, Gianni de Michelis in September 1990. 
The CSCM proposal was based on a comprehensive approach to Mediterranean 
stability; tackling economic, social, political, and military dimensions of security. 
It adopted the CSCE’s methodology of dividing the areas of cooperation into 
three ‘baskets’: political and security, economic, humanitarian and cultural.22 The 
Gulf War prevented any meeting from taking place, but it did not invalidate the 
economic, social and cultural need for European involvement in the region. On 
the contrary, anti-Western demonstrations in some North African countries were a 
warning sign of the social and economic unrest existing in those societies. But 
Italian interest in Euro-Mediterranean relations faded once de Michelis 
resigned,23 and domestic instability became a priority in Italy.
The Euro-Mediterranean relationship emphasised the traditional civil 
power policy,24 based on economic, social, and cultural relations, whereas the 
Gulf War prompted certain EU member countries to promote the creation of a 
European military structure to face post-Cold War threats. During the Maastricht 
Treaty negotiations, these demands clashed with countries in favour of NATO. 
Article J.4 of the EU Treaty is the cautious result of that clash.
Mediterranean security risks have grown since the end of the Gulf War. 
Civil war in Algeria, Libyan support of terrorism, and the slowness of the Middle 
East peace process have compelled South European countries to strengthen their 
pro-Mediterranean lobbying policy in the EC. At the same time, the desirable 
incorporation of Central and East European countries into European organisations 
has led to the creation of a new set of institutions like WEU associate partnership 
(1992), NATO partnership for peace, and, at the European Council of Essen in 




























































































The EU-Mediterranean lobby have supported that similar institutions be set 
up for the Mediterranean countries, although without the implication that these 
countries will eventually be included in the EU. This ‘parallel program’ is 
illustrated by many examples: the 1990 Italian proposal to create a Mediterranean 
Bank similar to EBRD; the Spanish and French proposal of creating a PHARE 
Plan for the Mediterranean;25 Spain’s proposal to organise a Mediterranean 
Partnership for Peace during a September 1994 NATO meeting in Seville;26 
France’s proposal for a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean during the Euro- 
Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona (November 1995) which Malta has also 
supported;'1 and the 1996 Italian plan to create a structured dialogue on the issues 
of security and diplomacy with the Mediterranean region.28
Manuel Marin (the Spanish Commissioner in charge of the EU’s relations 
with non-member Mediterranean countries) was committed to adapting the 
partnership instruments, created for Central and Eastern Europe, to the 
Mediterranean area. In March 1995, Marin published an article in Le Figaro 
entitled ‘La Méditerranée: une priorité au même titre que l'Europe ex­
communiste.’ The Commission’s policy eventually adopted Marin’s approach and 
he was personally supported by president Delors. According to Gillespie, Marin 
has been a central figure in the development of EU-Mediterranean policy since its 
former emphasis on cooperation to its current stress of partnership.29 (1996:210).
Euro-Mediterranean partnership vs Eastern enlargement
Marks30 points out that ‘the Southern Mediterranean, along with the former 
Soviet Union is considered by Europe to be one of the two main strategic regions 
bordering a progressively enlarging EU.’ The fact is, that both the emergence of 
the Mediterranean as a strategic region and the preparations for the Eastward 
enlargement of the EU are occurring simultaneously. This parallel course has 
been forcing the EU to link the two distinct projects and even make trade-offs 
between the two goals, in its attempt to balance the interests of the Eastern and 
Southern dimensions of Europe.
The balancing strategy initiated by the EU-Mediterranean lobby began to 
show results by mid-1994. In June 1994, the European Council of Corfu 
elaborated a new strategy towards both Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. 
The Council agreed that enlargement negotiations with East European countries 
should start after the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Reciprocal concessions 
were made to the Euro-Mediterranean lobby. The Corfu summit decided to create 
a zone of cooperation in the Mediterranean and agreed that enlargement 




























































































Intergovernmental Conference. It is worth noting that the Greek president fought 
very hard to get Cyprus included in the next stage of enlargement.
Committed to developing a partnership between the EU and the 
Mediterranean region, the EC established a new policy which departed greatly 
from its former policy emphasising cooperation. The document proposing the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership included the creation of a free-trade area, offered 
a substantial financial aid package, and designed a zone of cooperation leading 
towards a close association between the two regions.31 This Partnership 
emphasises two goals: in the short term it will expand the trade bloc surrounding 
the EU, and in the long term, it will create a real Euro-Mediterranean network, 
cooperating in the sectors of energy, environment, terrorism control, culture, and 
tourism.
In December 1996, The European Council of Essen endorsed the 
partnership idea proposed by the Commission, with the Mediterranean region 
constituting ‘a priority zone of strategic importance for the European Union.’32 
The Council accepted Spain’s offer to organise a Euro-Mediterranean Conference 
in the second half of 1995. This decision is considered to be another reciprocal 
concession, given that the Essen summit simultaneously adopted a strategy of 
structured dialogue with Central and Eastern European countries on EU 
enlargement.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership project was presented by EC 
President Jacques Delors as an effort to mitigate the cleavage between the 
Mediterranean lobby, led by Spain and France, and the eastern lobby, led by 
Germany. Delors underlined that the French and Spanish presidencies will be able 
to make an ‘ambitious’ policy for the region, once the northern countries, 
particularly Germany, understand that it is necessary to send a message fort to the 
South.33 Delors’s statement seems to have foreshadowed the events of the 
European Council of Cannes in June 1995. During that summit, the ambitious 
Mediterranean policy of France and Spain clashed with German-led Northern 
interests when it came to the allocation of resources to the project.
Before the Cannes summit, the Commission had produced a document 
concerning the Union’s relations with the Mediterranean countries. The 
communiqué proposed offering the Mediterranean program 5.5 billion ECU in an 
effort. According to Marin, this amount was hoped to re-establish the credibility 
of the EU’s relationship with the Mediterranean countries, which had been 
neglected due to EU interests in the Central and Eastern European countries.34 
The idea of putting the Mediterranean and Eastern European regions on equal 




























































































fully implemented by the Commission. The East-South balance was also apparent 
in the first report adopted by the Council (on April 10, 1995), in preparation for 
the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. In fact, the report emphasised the EU’s hope 
of creating complementary policies for both the East and the South in the interest 
of geopolitical coherence.35
Despite these preceding agreements, the balancing philosophy was put to 
the test during the Cannes summit. For the first time, the objectives of the 
Mediterranean lobby openly clashed with EU Eastern enlargement policy. France 
and Spain hoped to grant 5.5 billion ECU to the Mediterranean and 7 billion 
ECU. for Eastern Europe between 1995 and 1999. But the Northern countries 
(Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Denmark) favoured maintaining 
the policy in force from 1992 to 1996 and proposed grants be given to the two 
regions in a 5 to 1 ratio favouring Eastern European countries. The clash between 
Kohl and Gonzalez finally resulted in increasing grants to the Mediterranean 
countries (4.685 billion ECU) by 22 percent while grants to Central and Eastern 
Europe were increased by 8 per cent.36
The outcome of the Cannes summit suggests two conclusions: first, that 
Spain was successful in playing a leading role in the Mediterranean lobby, and 
second, that trade-offs were inevitable given the dual aims of Eastern enlargement 
and creating a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. According to Gillespie,
Spanish lobbying to strengthen the Mediterranean policy has been linked at important 
junctures to other issues on which Madrid’s support has been sought by Germany and 
other Northern member states, particularly in relation to EU policy towards Central- 
Eastern Europe. Spain has never opposed the European Union’s eastward expansion, 
from which there will be costs and dangers for economies including Spain’s, but 
Gonzalez’s last two governments were very careful about how Spain would give its 
consent, ensuring first that contrapartidas (reciprocal concessions), such as German 
acquiescence in the mid-1990s increase in the EU spending on the Mediterranean, were 
secured in return.37
CFSP agenda: Mediterranean plus Central and Eastern Europe
The June 1992 European Council of Lisbon adopted a report on the possible 
evolution of the CFSP. That report enumerated some factors that must be taken 
into consideration when defining the issues and areas of future cooperation, and 
included geographic proximity of regions, political and economic stability, and 
the existence of security threats.38 The report indicated several geographic areas 
in which the EU must be engaged: Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and 




























































































One can only wonder if CFSP has also adopted a balancing strategy in 
developing its joint actions. I argue that, apart from the Maghreb policy, the 
CFSP agenda focuses on the same geographic areas that were traditionally on the 
EPC agenda. Central and Eastern Europe, as members of CSCE, as well as the 
Middle East conflict were some of the first issues addressed by the EPC in the 
early 1970s. CFSP has not changed the scope of its agenda-which was always 
been determined by geography - but only the direction of their policies as a 
consequence of the new international order (the end of the Cold War and the 
peace process in the Middle East). For my purposes, the only CFSP-Central and 
Eastern European joint action deserving of attention is the Stability Pact, a kind of 
confidence and security-building mechanism mentioned in the Barcelona 
Declaration of 1995. As a result of the follow-up meetings after the Barcelona 
Conference, the European Council of Dublin (December 1996) proposed drafting 
a ‘Charter for Peace and Stability in the Euro-Mediterranean Region,’ with an aim 
to build security in the region through political dialogue, arms control, and Rule- 
of-Law mechanisms.
The Council has adopted two joint actions in support of the Middle East 
peace process. The first, adopted by the Council in April 1994, focuses on the 
organisation and observation of the Palestinian elections. The second policy, 
adopted in November 1996, appointed a European envoy to witness the peace 
process. These actions deserve two comments. First of all, it is necessary to 
emphasise the low profile role played by the Union in regard to the political 
dimension of the peace process. The above-mentioned joint actions left the crux 
of the negotiations in the hands of the United States. Even in its low-profile role, 
the Union has been much more engaged in Central and Eastern Europe, for 
example in its coordination of the PHARE Plan. As a matter of fact, the global 
coordination of international aid for the Middle East was entrusted to an ad hoc 
Liaison Committee and not directly to the Union which was the first donor to the
Second, it is necessary to emphasise Spain’s high-profile position in EU 
policy making. For instance, Madrid was the venue for the October 1991 Middle 
East Peace Conference, and in November 1996, the Council appointed a Spanish 
diplomat, Miguel Angel Moratinos, as the European envoy following the Peace 
Process. The high-profile role of Spain in the Middle East and as lobbyist for the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, leads one to wonder if the EU-Mediterranean 
lobby has a leader, playing a similar role to that of Germany in its support of 
Central and Eastern Europe.
Also, the Lisbon report brought a new priority to the European foreign 




























































































of ‘great common interest for the Union. Demographic growth, the repeated 
social crises, large scale emigration and the increase of fundamentalism and 
religious intégrisme are problems that endanger this stability.’40 On the basis of 
these dangers, the Lisbon Summit endorsed the idea of a Euro-Maghreb 
partnership in free trade, political dialogue, and economic, technical, cultural, and 
financial cooperation.
Since 1992, however, the problems for the Euro-Maghreb option have 
become obvious. The civil war in Algeria, the placement of economic sanctions 
on Libya by the CFSP (a common position adopted in November 1993), and the 
failure of the Arab-Maghreb Union have undermined the spirit of the Euro- 
Maghreb partnership. It became evident that the Maghreb is not a region in the 
process of economic integration, given its scarce horizontal exchanges. Nor is it 
an area of political entente. As a result, the Euro-Maghreb initiative was 
eventually turned into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
The failure of the Maghreb option was a shock to the French leaders of 
EU-Mediterranean policy. France had always supported cooperation initiatives 
between Europe and the Western Mediterranean (for example, Mitterrand’s 
proposal of convening a Western Mediterranean Conference in 1983 and the 
Western Mediterranean Group initiated in 1990). The Spanish-Italian proposal of 
convening a CSCM encompassing all of the Mediterranean countries was a 
challenge to the traditional French division between French-dominated Maghreb 
and Middle East. The French policy of chasse gardée in the Maghreb has muted 
in the 1990s in favour of Spain’s pro-Mediterranean lobby.41 According to 
Gillespie, ‘by successfully competing for the European Commission portfolios 
relating to the Mediterranean, and making the Mediterranean a priority area for 
the diplomatic service, Spain in the first half of the 1990s was able to play a 
leading role in shaping this aspect of EU policy.’42 In short, it is impossible to talk 
of a cohesive Mediterranean block within the EU because of the French-Spanish 
competition for he leadership role in the region.
Nevertheless, neither France nor Spain have been interested on bringing 
attention to the Maghreb area following the CFSP scheme (common positions, 
joint actions, declarations). For instance, neither the Algerian civil war nor the 
Western Sahara conflict have received special attention in the CFSP agenda. Far 
from being a major issue, the Algerian civil war rendered only three declarations 
from the CFSP out of the 300 adopted between the entry into force of the Treaty 
and the second semester of 1996. It is a paradox that the European Union, 
commencing an ambitious Euro-Mediterranean policy, has ignored, in diplomatic 
terms, the conflicts in Northern Africa. Could it be the result of differences 




























































































result of applying instruments created for the Central and Eastern Europe to the 
Mediterranean region?
Conclusions: Priority and Mistrust
It is obvious that the Mediterranean members of the Union are directly affected 
by the developments on the Sea’s Southern shore. This claim is supported by the 
fact that millions of Maghrebians live in France, that Spain is dependant on 
Algeria and Libya for gas, that Spain holds territories in North Africa, that drug 
traffic runs across the Strait of Gibraltar, and that there are territorial disputes in 
the Aegean Sea. In addition to these material concerns Europe and the 
Mediterranean countries share common experiences, and even ‘past trauma,’43 
where colonialism left an important mark. The French-Algerian relationship is 
much more than a foreign affairs issue, but is a domestically sensitive issue. 
Moreover, Spain fought its last international war in the 1920s against Moroccan 
troops.
In other words, the relationship with some or all of the Mediterranean 
countries is a priority for the Southern European members of the Union, at both 
the low politics level (fishing, investment, trade, environment) and the high 
politics level (conflict mediation, migration, terrorism, weapons proliferation). 
Are national interests therefore clashing with the Union’s policy objectives? If 
this is the case, can the Union meet the national expectations of its Member 
States?
This paper argues that the East-South dilemma is an EU priority. Although 
the Southern members essentially support EU Eastern enlargement, these 
countries, especially Spain, have tried to make the Mediterranean policy an even 
bigger priority for the Union agenda and have tried to retain more resources and 
commitment to the Mediterranean region. In fact, creating a strong Euro- 
Mediterranean network was the main objective of the Barcelona Conference. The 
notion of interdependence, as the basis for increasing security in the region, is the 
main driving force of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
Northern EU Member States, feeling only indirectly affected by 
Mediterranean security issues, seem reluctant to accept some of the policies put 
forth by the Southern Member States, particularly when principles or financial 
resources are involved. But has the Union the means to meet the objectives of its 
Southern members? With regard to principles, the pragmatic policies adopted by 
Spain or France in the field of human rights in the Maghreb countries have 




























































































resources, the Cannes summit is the best example that the Southern EU member- 
states were forced to temper their high expectations.
In any case, the Northern EU Member States have converging interests 
with their Southern partners on Mediterranean matters where trade and 
investment are concerned. In this sense, Marks points out that ‘the creation of a 
free-trade zone encompassing both flanks of the Mediterranean - and linked in to 
an area stretching North to the Arctic circle and East to the confines of the former 
Soviet Union-fits into the 1990s dynamic of building large transnational trading 
and investment blocs.’45 (1996:2). Inevitably, in terms of common foreign and 
security policy, sensitive issues for some members, like the Algerian civil war for 
France, will prevent a unanimous position on the matter. Apparently, the idea of a 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, resembling the Europe Agreements based on 
free trade, economic cooperation, and political dialogue, is too ambitious for the 
time being.
The EU-Central and Eastern Europe relationship is substantially different 
from the Euro-Mediterranean relationship. In terms of security, one can clearly 
see the difference. On the one hand, the relationship between the Union and 
Central and Eastern European countries is based on mutual confidence. In other 
words, these countries have psychologically agreed to be part of a pluralistic 
community of security formed by the Fifteen and, as far as they are concerned, 
these countries share an ‘EU identity.’ In Deutsch’s words, the countries forming 
a community of security eliminate the use of force among them.46 That is to say, 
they constitute a ‘zone of peace.’ The Franco-German reconciliation in the 
framework of the Union is the best example of this peace-making mechanism. 
Democratic regimes and the acceptance of the European integration principles 
constitute a basis for the community. On the other hand, the EU-Mediterranean 
relationship is more complex. In a sense, it is ‘a group of states whose primary 
security concerns link together sufficiently closely that the national securities 
cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.47 The existence of such 
a complex of security habeen cited by Southern EU members as proof for the 
need to develop a partnership between both shores based the instruments used in 
the EU, WEU and NATO for Central and Eastern Europe.
The basic problem of that Partnership in matters of politics and security is 
the negative perception of the so-called complex of security. In other words, the 
mistrust between both shores. The Arab world has criticised the Euro- 
Mediterranean operation, arguing that the Europeans have turned Mediterranean 
economic and social problems into their own security problems. The mistrust 
stems as much from the traditional dimensions of security (military dimension) as 




























































































identity. A case in point differences in interpreting human rights between Europe 
and the Mediterranean region. Another point of contention is the reluctance of the 
Maghreb countries to accept NATO's new role in the Mediterranean. The 
Maghreb countries repeatedly have accused the Mediterranean lobby (France, 
Spain and Italy) of creating troops and units (Eurofor and Euromarfor) to interfere 
in South Mediterranean affairs.48 At the same time, European countries have 
compelled Mediterranean countries to participate in political dialogues in an 
effort to build confidence, beginning with the Barcelona follow-up process and 
later with NATO and WEU.49 These developments resembles more closely the 
defense-detente philosophy of the East-West period than the present relationship 
between the Union and Eastern Europe.
In short, EU’s policy of balancing its Eastern and Southern concerns has 
been more a pragmatic measure than a long-standing planned policy. For the time 
being, the international priorities of the individual states have been reconciled 
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